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Abstract
We show the adequacy of axioms and proof rules for strict and lazy functional programs. Our
basic logic comprises a huge part of what is common to the two styles of functional programming.
The logic for call-by-value is obtained by adding the axiom that says that all variables are defined,
whereas the logic for call-by-name is obtained by adding the axiom that postulates the existence
of an undefined object for each type. To show the correctness of the axiomatization we do not use
denotational semantics and the adequacy of the evaluation of programs with respect to the semantics.
Instead we use the standard term models based on call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation. We
introduce a new method to prove on the syntactical level the monotonicity of the evaluation of
functional programs with unbounded recursion. The direct method yields results concerning the
proof-theoretic strength of the axiomatization. As a side result we obtain a syntactical proof of the
context lemma for simply typed lambda terms with recursion.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Functional programming; Call-by-value evaluation; Call-by-name evaluation; Monotonicity of
evaluation; Context lemma
1. Introduction
One of the main arguments in favor of functional programming is that it is easier to
verify functional programs than imperative programs. Since functional programs have no
side effects, the evaluation of a program does not change the global state and reasoning
about programs is therefore much easier. The same techniques can be used as in ordinary
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mathematics. There are, however, differences. Functional programs may not terminate and
therefore a logic for functional programs has to deal with termination and partial functions.
Functional programs are mainly based on recursion and therefore a logic for functional
programs needs appropriate axioms and proof rules for recursion. Moreover, there are two
main streams in functional programming. On one hand there is ML [13] with a strict (call-
by-value) evaluation strategy and on the other hand there is Haskell [9] with lazy (call-by-
name) evaluation. A logic for functional programs should therefore cover both styles of
programming.
We think that a reduction calculus for a functional programming language is not enough.
In addition, axioms and proof rules are needed in order for it to be possible to reason about
properties of programs in a mathematical way. We view a reduction calculus (β-reduction,
etc.) only as the basis for a richer formal system that includes quantifiers and induction
principles and allows one to formulate and prove complex statements about programs using
the full power of logic. The reduction calculus is then used to justify the axioms and proof
rules. The reduction calculus is simply a bridge between the formal system and the actual
implementation of the programming language. In the reduction calculus alone, one cannot
prove anything interesting about programs except that they are β-equivalent.
What are the axioms and proof rules for prominent functional languages like ML and
Haskell? We continue the approach started in [18] which is based on a typed logic of
partial terms (the system BPT) and is the common ground for call-by-value (or strict)
languages like ML and call-by-name (or lazy) languages like Haskell. We give a direct
interpretation of the axioms and proof rules of BPT in terms of call-by-value and call-by-
name evaluation and avoid the detour over denotational semantics of [18]. This does not
mean that denotational semantics is useless. It just means that denotational semantics is in
our case not needed to show the correctness of the axioms and proof rules even in the case
of higher types.
Properties of programs that can be derived in the basic logic of partial terms (BPT)
are true for call-by-value evaluation as well as for call-by-name evaluation. The logic for
call-by-value evaluation (VPT) is obtained from the basic system simply by adding axioms
that ensure that quantifiers range over defined objects only. The additional axioms say that
for each type τ every variable of type τ is defined. In the case of call-by-name evaluation
(NPT) we simply add axioms that postulate the existence of undefined objects for each type
and therefore the quantifiers range also over undefined objects. Hence, our axiomatizations
of functional programming show that the world of strict functional programming (ML) and
the world of lazy functional programming (Haskell) have more in common than one might
think.
We say that a logic L is adequate for call-by-x evaluation, if the following two properties
hold for any closed program t:
(1.1) The formula t ↓ is derivable in the logic L iff the call-by-x evaluation of the program t
terminates.
(1.2) If t is of basic type ι and v is a value of ι, then the equation t = v is derivable in the
logic L iff the call-by-x evaluation of the program t terminates with result v.
The two conditions are the minimal requirements a logic has to fulfill in order that formulas
that are derived in the logic can be interpreted in the real world. Assume, for example, that
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we can derive in the logic L that the domain of a program s is included in the domain of a
program t :
∀x (s x ↓ → t x ↓).
Given that this formula is derivable, how can we conclude that in the real world the
program t terminates on each input on which the program s terminates?
We can use condition (1.1). If the program s terminates on the input v, then this fact
is derivable in the logic L, i.e., we can derive the formula s v↓. But then we can also
derive the formula t v↓ and again by condition (1.1), we can conclude that the program t
terminates on the input v.
For another example, assume that s and t are two programs that take an argument of
type integer and return an integer. Assume that we can derive in the logic L that s and t
have the same input/output behavior:
∀x (s x = t x).
How can we conclude that in the real world the two programs compute the same functions
on the integers?
We can use condition (1.2). If the program s computes for the argument i the result j ,
then according to condition (1.2) the equation s i = j is derivable in the logic L. But then
we can also derive the equation t i = j in L. Again by condition (1.2), we can conclude
that the program t computes on the argument i the same result j .
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define syntax and evaluation
semantics of simply typed functional programs with recursion. Then we summarize in
Section 3 the axioms and rules of the basic logic of partial terms of [18] and some important
derivable principles. In Section 4 we show the adequacy of an extension of the basic logic
of partial terms for call-by-value evaluation by a direct interpretation of the logic. The
main technical point is the monotonicity of the call-by-value evaluation for programs with
recursion. In Section 5 we do the same for call-by-name evaluation. Section 6 contains a
syntactical proof of the context lemma. Finally, we conclude with some general remarks
on functional programming in Section 7.
1.1. Related work
Feferman uses in [4,5] Beeson’s logic of partial terms [1] to provide a logical foundation
for the use of type systems in functional programming and to set up logics for the
termination and correctness of programs. His logics are of great expressive power and
flexibility while minimal in proof-theoretic strength. Our logics are typed versions of
Beeson’s logic of partial terms suitable for typed functional programs with recursion and
different evaluation strategies.
Howe introduces in [8] a general method for proving congruence of bisimulation-
like equivalences in functional programming languages. His so-called precongruence
candidate has similar properties to our auxiliary relations ≤1, ≤2, ≤3. It is not clear how
the least fixed point properties that we need in this paper can be obtained using the general
method. Howe’s method is extended by Gordon to typed functional languages in [6].
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Kahle and Studer write in [10] that in typed functional programming languages, like
ML, fixed point operators are built in, but there is no way to guarantee on the syntactical
level that the solution produced by these operators will be the least fixed point. They
claim that the least fixed point property is only given by the semantical interpretation.
We do not agree. This paper contains a proof on the syntactical level that the built-in
recursion operators of strict and lazy functional programming languages are indeed the
least fixed points. In addition, Kahle and Studer point out that beside the difference of a
typed and untyped approach their theory allows a recursion-theoretic model, whereas the
logics of [18] have domain-theoretic interpretations only. In this paper, we show that the
domain-theoretic interpretations in [18] are not needed and that the main results of [18]
can be obtained on the syntactical level. We give interpretations of the logics directly in
terms of call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation. Note also that in our basic logic of
partial terms we can derive ¬(rec f x . f x) v↓ for any syntactical value v (see the proof
of Lemma 3.2). Hence, there are provably non-terminating programs in our theory as there
are in the theory LFP of [10].
In [14], Moran and Sands develop an operational theory for the call-by-need λ-calculus
with recursive lets, constructors, and case expressions. Their theory is cost-sensitive and
reflects the computational distinctions between call-by-need and call-by-name. It would be
interesting to extend their theory into a logic in a similar way to what we do in this paper
for call-by-value and call-by-name.
Schwichtenberg’s Minlog system [2] is designed as an interactive proof system for the
synthesis of functional programs. The underlying logic is based on first-order formulas
over simply typed λ-terms with higher-type primitive recursion. The programs extracted
from proofs are always total.
Thompson describes in [21] a logic for the lazy functional programming language
Miranda. There are several differences between Thompson’s logic and our logic NPT for
call-by-name. First, he follows Scott’s approach in the Logic of Computable Functions
(LCF) and uses constants ⊥ that denote an undefined value for each type. We use a
definedness predicate instead. As explained in [18] the two approaches are not equivalent.
Second, Thompson has no axioms which express that recursive function definitions denote
the least solution of the corresponding equations. He has just the fixed point axiom (3.41)
but not the minimality axiom (3.20) below. Thompson sketches in [21, Sect. 4.1] a proof of
the adequacy of a subsystem of his logic with respect to evaluation of Miranda programs.
For the full logic, however, he refers to denotational semantics.
2. Evaluation of functional programs
The fundamental concept in functional programming is the concept of recursively
defined functions. A recursively defined function is given by a recursion equation
f (x) = t ( f, x)
where the function f can be called in the body of its definition. We use the syntax
rec f x .t ( f, x) for such functions. In ML, it corresponds to the term
let fun f x = t ( f, x) in f end.
R.F. Stärk / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 293–318 297
We consider simply typed programs. Types are either basic types ι, or function types
σ → τ . Types are inductively generated as follows:
σ, τ ::= ι | σ → τ.
We assume for each type τ a countably infinite set of variables xτ , yτ , . . . of type τ . Terms
(or programs) are denoted by r, s, t . We write tτ to indicate that the term t is of type τ .
Terms are inductively generated. They are of the following kinds:
(1) variables: xτ , yτ , . . . , f σ→τ , gσ→τ , . . .,
(2) constants: cι,
(3) applications: (sσ→τ tσ )τ ,
(4) abstractions: (λxσ .tτ )σ→τ ,
(5) recursively defined functions: (rec f σ→τ xσ .tτ )σ→τ .
In the following we omit the types unless it is really necessary to indicate them. However,
all terms are typed in this article. Omitting the types, terms are of the following form:
r, s, t ::= x | f | c | s t | λx .t | rec f x .t
The set of free variables of a term t is denoted by FV(t). The result of the evaluation of a
closed term is a value. Values are denoted by u, v,w. Values are nothing but closed terms
of the following form:
u, v,w ::= c | λx .t | rec f x .t
The relation t −→ev
v
v means that the call-by-value evaluation of the closed term t yields
the result v. Similarly, the relation t −→ev
n
v means the call-by-name evaluation of t yields
the result v. The relation u v −→ap
v
w means that u applied to v yields the result w under
call-by-value, whereas u t −→ap
n
w means that u applied to the unevaluated t yields the
result w under call-by-name. The rules for call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation are
v −→ev
v
v
s −→evv u t −→evv v u v −→apv w
s t −→ev
v
w
t[u/x] −→evv v
(λx .t) u −→ap
v
v
t[u/x, rec f x .t/ f ] −→ev
v
v
(rec f x .t) u −→ap
v
v
v −→evn v
s −→ev
n
u u t −→ap
n
v
s t −→ev
n
v
t[s/x] −→ev
n
v
(λx .t) s −→ap
n
v
t[s/x, rec f x .t/ f ] −→ev
n
v
(rec f x .t) s −→ap
n
v
.
If we forget the types and the recursively defined functions, then t −→ev
v
v is exactly
Plotkin’s evalV (t) = v of [16] and t −→evn v is evalN (t) = v.
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3. The basic logic of partial terms
The syntax of the basic logic of partial terms is that of many-sorted first-order predicate
calculus, extended by a definedness predicate (written as an arrow that points down) and a
binary predicate τ for each type τ . The atomic formulas of BPT are t ↓ and sτ τ tτ . The
meaning of t ↓ is that t is defined, whereas the meaning of s τ t is that s approximates t .
We often omit the type superscripts. Hence, s τ t implies that s and t are both terms of
type τ .
The formulas of BPT are generated from the atomic formulas by applying the logical
connectives and quantifiers and are of the form ¬A, A ∧ B , A ∨ B , A → B , ∀xτ A and
∃xτ A. The result of substituting a term t of type τ for a variable x of the same type in A is
indicated as A[t/x], or A(t) when A is written as A(x).
The partial equality  as well as the strict equality = are defined symbols. For each
type τ , formulas sτ  tτ and sτ = tτ are defined using the basic predicates. In the
following definition, the notion A :≡ B means that A is a syntactic abbreviation for B .
(3.1) s  t :≡ s  t ∧ t  s. (3.2) s = t :≡ s ↓ ∧ t ↓ ∧ s  t .
The intuitive meaning of the partial equation s  t is that (i) s is defined iff t is defined
and (ii) if they are both defined, then they are equal. The meaning of the strict equation
s = t is that s and t are both defined and equal.1
3.1. Axioms and rules of the basic logic of partial terms
It is important to note that most of the axioms below are actually axiom schemes and r ,
s, t range over arbitrary terms. Some axioms are restricted to syntactic values. By that we
mean terms generated as follows:
u˜, v˜ ::= x | c | λx .t | rec f x .t
Note that syntactic values may contain free variables.
I. Propositional axioms: All propositional tautologies.
II. Quantifier axioms: For syntactic values v˜ of type τ :
(3.3) ∀xτ A(x) → A(v˜). (3.4) A(v˜) → ∃xτ A(x).
III. Rules of inference:
(3.5) A A → B
B
. (3.6) A(y
τ ) → B
∃xτ A(x) → B (∗). (3.7)
B → A(yτ )
B → ∀xτ A(x)(∗).
(∗) if the variable y does not appear free in the conclusion.
IV. Definedness:
(3.8) t ↓ → ∃x (t  x), for x /∈ FV(t).
(3.9) c↓, (λx .t)↓, (rec f x .t)↓.
1 In [18] the basic symbols of the logic are the definedness predicate (↓) and the strict equality (=). The
approximation relation () is a defined symbol in [18]. The two approaches are equivalent.
R.F. Stärk / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 293–318 299
V. Application and abstraction:
(3.10) (s t)↓ → s ↓ ∧ ∃x (t  x), for x /∈ FV(t).
(3.11) (λx .t) v˜  t[v˜/x], for syntactic values v˜.
VI. Approximation:
(3.12) t τ t .
(3.13) r τ s ∧ s τ t → r τ t .
(3.14) s τ t ∧ s ↓ → t ↓.
(3.15) s ↓ ∨ s τ t .
(3.16) s ι t ∧ s ↓ → t ι s.
(3.17) s ↓∧ t ↓∧∀xσ (s x τ t x) → s σ→τ t .
VII. Monotonicity:
(3.18) s σ→τ s′ ∧ t σ t ′ → s t τ s′ t ′.
VIII. Least fixed points:
(3.19) (λx .t)[rec f x .t/ f ]  (rec f x .t).
(3.20) (λx .t)[v˜/ f ]  v˜ → (rec f x .t)  v˜, for syntactic values v˜.
IX. Computational induction: Let A( f ) :≡ ∀x ( f x ↓ → B(x, f x)), where f is of type
σ → ι and ι is a basic type, or let A( f ) :≡ ∀x ( f x ↓ → B(x)), where f is of type σ → τ
and τ is arbitrary. Then the induction scheme is
(3.21) ∀ f (A( f ) → A(λx .t)) → A(rec f x .t).
Remark 3.1. The scheme of computational induction (3.21) is Shankar’s version of the
de Bakker–Scott induction principle [17]. The formula A( f ) is admissible (or chain
complete). This means that A(∅) is obviously true, and if A( fn) is true for every fn of
an increasing sequence of functions then also A(supn∈N fn) is true.
3.2. Derivable principles
We summarize several basic principles that are derivable in the basic logic of partial
terms. As we will see later, the principles will be valid for call-by-value as well as for call-
by-name. First, we observe that the partial equality is an equivalence relation. The strict
equality is also an equivalence relation but on defined terms only.
(3.22) t  t .
(3.23) s  t → t  s.
(3.24) r  s ∧ s  t → r  t .
(3.25) t ↓ → t = t .
(3.26) s = t → t = s.
(3.27) r = s ∧ s = t → r = t .
Moreover, the application is compatible with the partial equality.
(3.28) s  s′ ∧ t  t ′ → s t  s′ t ′.
The definedness predicate can be expressed using strict equality.
(3.29) t ↓ ↔ ∃x (t = x), for x /∈ FV(t).
The partial equality can also be expressed using the definedness predicate and strict
equality.
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(3.30) s  t ↔ (s ↓ ∨ t ↓ → s = t).
The approximation relations can be characterized for each type.
(3.31) s ι t ↔ (s ↓ → s = t).
(3.32) s σ→τ t ↔ (s ↓ → t ↓ ∧ ∀xσ (s x τ t x)).
The strict equality is extensional for defined function terms.
(3.33) s ↓ ∧ t ↓ ∧ ∀x (s x  t x) → s = t .
Terms are monotonic with respect to substitution.
(3.34) ∀x (s  t) → (λx .s)  (λx .t).
(3.35) ∀ f, x (s  t) → (rec f x .s)  (rec f x .t).
(3.36) s  t → r [s/x]  r [t/x].
Terms that are partially equal can be substituted for each other.
(3.37) s  t ∧ A(s) → A(t).
The quantifier axioms can be extended from syntactic values to defined terms.
(3.38) ∀x A(x) ∧ t ↓ → A(t). (3.39) A(t) ∧ t ↓ → ∃x A(x).
The β-axiom can also be extended to defined terms.
(3.40) s ↓ → (λx .t) s  t[s/x].
In the fixed point axiom (3.19) the less than or equal to relation can be replaced by equality.
(3.41) (λx .t)[rec f x .t/ f ] = (rec f x .t).
Using this equation the following β-axiom for recursive functions is derivable:
(3.42) (rec f x .t) v˜  t[v˜/x, rec f x .t/ f ], for syntactic values v˜.
3.3. Models of the basic logic of partial terms
The main goal of this article is to provide direct interpretations of the basic logic of
partial terms in terms of call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation. Besides these direct
interpretations there exist also models of the basic logic of partial terms based on CPOs
(complete partial orders where each non-empty, directed set has a least upper bound). There
are two different kinds of models which we want to sketch here briefly. The construction of
the models and the corresponding adequacy theorems are explained in detail in [18]. One
model uses strict functions, whereas the other model uses arbitrary monotonic functions.
The functions do not have to be Scott continuous. Monotonicity suffices.
Before we describe the models we summarize some notation. The CPO consisting of all
monotonic functions from A to B is denoted by [A → B]. If A and B are pointed (contain
a least element ⊥), then a function f : A → B is called strict if f (⊥) = ⊥. The space
of all strict, monotonic functions from A to B is denoted by [A ◦→ B]. The lift A⊥ of a
CPO A is obtained by adding a fresh bottom element ⊥ to A. Since the space [A → B⊥] is
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isomorphic to [A⊥ ◦→ B⊥], strict monotonic functions from A⊥ to B⊥ can be identified
with points in the space [A → B⊥].
To obtain the model with strict functions, to each type τ a CPO Dτ is constructed. One
starts with a discrete set Dι for each basic type ι. A function type σ → τ is interpreted as
the space Dσ→τ = [Dσ → (Dτ )⊥]. Variables of type τ range over elements of Dτ and
denote therefore defined elements. The denotation of a term t of type τ is an element of
the space (Dτ )⊥. The term is considered to be defined if its denotation is different from ⊥.
A recursive function rec f x .t of type σ → τ is interpreted as the least fixed point of the
monotonic operator that maps a function a ∈ Dσ→τ to the function from Dσ into (Dτ )⊥
that assigns to an element b ∈ Dσ the value of the term t in (Dτ )⊥ when the variable f is
bound to the function a and x is bound to b.
In a similar way one can construct the model with arbitrary (not necessarily strict)
monotonic functions. To each basic type ι a flat CPO Eι with bottom element ⊥ is assigned.
A function type σ → τ is interpreted as the lifted CPO Eσ→τ = [Eσ → Eτ ]⊥. Hence,
each space Eτ contains a bottom element ⊥. Variables of type τ range over elements in Eτ
and the denotation of a term t of type τ is in Eτ . Variables can be bound to the bottom
element ⊥, and a function applied to ⊥ is allowed to have a result different from ⊥.
3.4. Extensions for call-by-value and call-by-name
Two extension of the basic logic of partial terms are introduced in [18]. The first
extension VPT is adequate for call-by-value evaluation, whereas the other extension NPT
is adequate for call-by-name evaluation.
VPT := BPT + ∀xτ x ↓ NPT := BPT + ∃xτ¬x ↓.
In VPT we postulate that variables are defined for every type. As a consequence, the
formula ∃x (t  x) is equivalent to t ↓ in VPT (if x is not free in t). In VPT one can derive
from Axiom (3.10) the formula (s t)↓ → t ↓. The formula means that, if an application is
defined, the argument is defined, too. This is certainly true for call-by-value evaluation.
In NPT we postulate that for each type there exist undefined elements. As a
consequence, the formula ∃x (t  x) is derivable in NPT (if x is not free in t) as well
as the unrestricted quantifier axioms. By the unrestricted quantifier axioms we mean the
following formulas for arbitrary terms t:
∀xτ A(x) → A(tτ ) and A(tτ ) → ∃xτ A(x).
Lemma 3.2. Over BPT the unrestricted quantifier axioms are equivalent to the axioms
∃xτ¬x ↓ for each type τ .
Proof. Assume ∃xτ¬x ↓ for each type τ . We show how to derive the axiom ∀xτ A(x) →
A(t). Assume that ∀xτ A(x).
Case t ↓: We obtain A(t) by (3.38).
Case ¬t ↓: Let yτ be a variable not free in t such that ¬y↓. Then we have t  y and
obtain A(t) by the substitution principle (3.37).
The axiom A(t) → ∃xτ A(x) for the existential quantifier can be derived in a similar
way.
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For the converse direction assume the unrestricted quantifier axioms. Consider the term
t :≡ (rec f σ→τ xσ . f x)yσ of type τ . Using computational induction we can derive ¬t ↓ as
follows. Take A( f ) :≡ ∀x ( f x ↓ → ⊥). Then we have A( f ) → A(λx . f x) and, by (3.21),
we obtain A(rec f x . f x) and therefore ¬t ↓. We can apply the unrestricted axiom for the
existential quantifier and obtain ∃yτ¬y ↓. 
Using the unrestricted quantifier axioms we can derive in NPT from (3.11) and (3.42)
the following unrestricted versions of the β-axioms for arbitrary terms s:
(3.43) (λx .t) s  t[s/x].
(3.44) (rec f x .t) s  t[s/x, rec f x .t/ f ].
Remark 3.3. If we forget the types and just consider the fragment of the logic that deals
with the definedness predicate and strict/partial equality, then VPT corresponds to Beeson’s
logic of partial terms [1] extended by the extensionality axiom.
4. Adequacy of the logic for call-by-value
We extend the call-by-value evaluation function to a total function which returns
the value ⊥ in the case where the evaluation of the program does no terminate. The
introduction of the symbol ⊥ is not essential but it simplifies the presentation. Let V τ
be the set of closed values of type τ and Vˆ τ the same set extended by the symbol ⊥, i.e.,
Vˆ τ := V τ ∪ {⊥}. Elements of Vˆ τ are denoted by uˆ, vˆ, wˆ. The call-by-value application
function and the call-by-value evaluation function are defined as follows:
apply(uˆ, vˆ) :=
{
w, if uˆ vˆ −→ap
v
w;
⊥, if there is no w with uˆ vˆ −→ap
v
w.
eval(t) :=
{
v, if t −→evv v;⊥, if there is no v with t −→evv v.
The functions have the following properties:
(4.1) apply(⊥, vˆ) = ⊥ = apply(uˆ,⊥).
(4.2) apply(λx .t, v) = eval(t[v/x]).
(4.3) apply(rec f x .t, v) = eval(t[v/x, rec f x .t/ f ]).
(4.4) eval(vˆ) = vˆ.
(4.5) eval(s t) = apply(eval(s), eval(t)).
Definition 4.1. The call-by-value approximation relation ≤τ on the set Vˆ τ is defined by
induction on the type τ :
uˆ ≤ι vˆ :⇐⇒ uˆ = ⊥ or uˆ = vˆ
uˆ ≤σ→τ vˆ :⇐⇒ uˆ = ⊥ or
vˆ = ⊥ and apply(uˆ, w) ≤τ apply(vˆ, w) for every w ∈ V σ .
By an induction on types one can see that the relations so defined are pre-orderings and
that ⊥ is the least element in Vˆ τ . We have:
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(4.6) vˆ ≤τ vˆ.
(4.7) If uˆ ≤τ vˆ and vˆ ≤τ wˆ, then uˆ ≤τ wˆ.
(4.8) If vˆ ≤τ ⊥, then vˆ = ⊥.
A call-by-value environment is a finite function that assigns to variables closed values
(different from ⊥) of the same type:
E = {xτ11 → vτ11 , . . . , xτnn → vτnn }.
An environment E can be applied to a term t (written t E) and is then understood as a
simultaneous substitution. By E[x → v] we denote the environment obtained from E
by adding the binding x → v and thereby overriding an old binding for x in E if one
exists. If an environment E covers the free variables of a formula A, then the call-by-value
interpretation [[A]]E ∈ {t, f} is defined in the following way:
[[t ↓]]E :=
{
t, if eval(t E) = ⊥;
f, otherwise.
[[s  t]]E :=
{
t, if eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E);
f, otherwise.
[[∀xτ A]]E :=
{
t, if [[A]]E[x →v] = t for each v ∈ V τ ;
f, otherwise.
[[∃xτ A]]E :=
{
t, if there exists a v ∈ V τ with [[A]]E[x →v] = t;
f, otherwise.
For the boolean connectives the truth value is defined using the standard truth tables of
classical propositional logic.
The main goal is now to show that the axioms and rules of VPT are valid under this
interpretation. Except for the monotonicity axiom (3.18), the minimality axiom (3.20) and
the scheme for computational induction (3.21), this is an easy task. We first observe that
the following substitution principle holds.
Lemma 4.2 (Substitution for Call-by-value).
If v˜ is a syntactic value, then [[A[v˜/x]]]E = [[A]]E[x →v˜E].
Proof. Consider a term t . Then t[v˜/x]E = t (E[x → v˜E]). Hence we have
eval(t[v˜/x]E) = eval(t (E[x → v˜E])).
Thus for atomic formulas we immediately obtain
[[t[v˜/x]↓]]E = [[t ↓]]E[x →v˜E] and [[(s  t)[v˜/x]]]E = [[s  t]]E[x →v˜E].
The extension to arbitrary formulas is shown by induction on the length of a formula. 
That the quantifier axioms (3.3) and (3.4) as well as the quantifier rules (3.6) and
(3.7) of BPT are valid under the call-by-value interpretation follows immediately from
the substitution principle.
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The additional axiom ∀xτ x ↓ of VPT is true, since variables are bound to values in a
call-by-value environment and values evaluate to themselves and are different from ⊥.
For the definedness axiom t ↓ → ∃x (t  x) (3.8), where x is not free in t , assume that
[[t ↓]]E = t. This means that there exists a value v such that eval(t E) = v. We can take v
and see that [[t  x]]E[x →v] = t. Hence, ∃x (t  x) is true under E .
The other definedness axioms c↓, (λx .t)↓, (rec f x .t)↓ (3.9) are true, since constants,
lambda abstractions and recursively defined functions are values.
For the axiom (s t)↓ → s ↓∧ t ↓ (3.10) assume that (s t)↓ is true under E . This means
that eval((s t)E) = ⊥. By (4.5), we have
eval((s t)E) = apply(eval(s E), eval(t E)).
Hence, by (4.1), it must be the case that eval(s E) = ⊥ and eval(t E) = ⊥. Hence, both
formulas s ↓ and t ↓ are true under E .
The validity of the β-axiom (λx .t) v˜  t[v˜/x] (3.11) for syntactic values v˜ follows
from the following calculation:
eval(((λx .t) v˜)E) = apply(eval((λx .t)E), eval(v˜E)) (4.5)
= apply((λx .t)E, v˜E) (4.4)
= eval(t E[x → v˜E]) (4.2)
= eval(t[v˜/x]E).
The validity of the reflexivity axiom (3.12) and the transitivity axiom (3.13) for the
formal symbol  follows directly from the corresponding properties of the call-by-value
approximation relation ≤ in (4.6) and (4.7).
For the axiom s  t ∧ s ↓ → t ↓ (3.14) assume that eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E) and
eval(s E) = ⊥. By (4.8), it follows that eval(t E) = ⊥; hence the axiom is true.
For the axiom s ↓∨s τ t (3.15) there are two cases. If eval(s E) = ⊥, then the formula
s  t is true under E . If eval(s E) = ⊥, then the formula s ↓ is true under E .
For the axiom s ι t ∧ s ↓ → t ι s (3.16) assume that eval(s E) ≤ι eval(t E) and
eval(s E) = ⊥. Then eval(s E) = eval(t E) (Definition 4.1) and hence the formula t ι s is
true under E .
For the axiom s ↓∧ t ↓∧∀xσ (s x τ t x) → s σ→τ t (3.17), where x is not free in s
or t , assume that eval(s E) = ⊥, eval(t E) = ⊥ and ∀xσ (s x τ t x) is true under E . We
have to show that eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E). Let w be a closed value of type σ . Then we have
apply(eval(s E),w) = apply(eval(s E), eval(w)) (4.4)
= eval(s E w) (4.5)
= eval((s x)E[x → w]) (x not free in s)
≤ eval((t x)E[x → w])
= apply(eval(t E),w).
Hence, by the definition of ≤ in Definition 4.1, we have eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E).
R.F. Stärk / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 293–318 305
For the closure axiom (λx .t)[rec f x .t/ f ]  (rec f x .t) (3.19) let E be an environment
that covers all free variables of rec f x .t and let u :≡ (rec f x .t)E . We have to show that
(λx .t)E[ f → u] ≤ u. Let w be a closed value. Then we have
apply((λx .t)E[ f → u], w) (4.2)= eval(t E[ f → u, x → w]) (4.3)= apply(u, w).
By the definition of ≤ in Definition 4.1, it follows that the closure axiom is true.
How can we show the validity of the monotonicity axiom (3.18)? We need to prove that
the call-by-value application is monotonic in the following sense:
(4.9) If v ≤ w, then apply(u, v) ≤ apply(u, w).
What about the minimality axiom (3.20) for recursively defined functions? We have to
show the following property:
(4.10) If (λx .t)[v/ f ] ≤ v, then (rec f x .t) ≤ v.
Attempts to prove properties (4.9) or (4.10) by induction on the type or by induction on
−→evv , −→apv fail very soon. Therefore we inductively define two new relations u ≤1 v
and u ≤2 v. We will see in Lemma 4.6 below that the relation ≤2 is the same as the
relation ≤. Hence, ≤2 is just another characterization of the approximation relation ≤. The
clauses of the following definition are exactly what is needed to prove the monotonicity of
the application with respect to ≤2 by simple induction on the length of the call-by-value
evaluation and to prove the minimality property (4.10).
Definition 4.3. The relations u ≤1 v and u ≤2 v are inductively generated by the fol-
lowing clauses:
(4.11) c ≤1 c.
(4.12) If s = (λx .t) or s = (rec f x .t), and E(y) ≤2 F(y) for each y ∈ FV(s), then
s E ≤1 s F .
(4.13) If (λx .t)[v/ f ] ≤ v, then (rec f x .t) ≤1 v.
(4.14) If u ≤1 v and v ≤ w, then u ≤2 w.
The first three clauses are for the relation ≤1 and the fourth clause is for the relation ≤2.
The relation ≤2 is extended to Vˆ τ in the obvious way such that ⊥ is the least element. It
is easy to see that both relations are reflexive. Moreover, the relation ≤ implies ≤2 and the
relation ≤1 implies ≤2. We have:
(4.15) v ≤1 v, v ≤2 v.
(4.16) If u ≤2 v and v ≤ w, then u ≤2 w.
(4.17) If u ≤ v, then u ≤2 v.
(4.18) If u ≤1 v, then u ≤2 v.
Why do we introduce these relations and not others? Since the following technical
lemma for ≤2 can be proved by induction on the length of the call-by-value evaluation
of a term.
Lemma 4.4. For terms t, environments E, F and values u, u′, v, v′ we have:
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(a) If E(x) ≤2 F(x) for each x ∈ FV(t), then eval(t E) ≤2 eval(t F).
(b) If u ≤2 u′ and v ≤2 v′, then apply(u, v) ≤2 apply(u′, v′).
Proof. By induction on t −→evv w and u v −→apv w we simultaneously prove:
(a) If t E −→ev
v
w and E(x) ≤2 F(x) for each x ∈ FV(t), then w ≤2 eval(t F).
(b) If u v −→ap
v
w and u ≤2 u′ and v ≤2 v′, then w ≤2 apply(u′, v′).
(a) Assume that t E −→ev
v
w and E(x) ≤2 F(x) for each x ∈ FV(t).
Case 1: t = y.
Since y E −→evv E(y), we obtain that w = E(y) ≤2 F(y) = eval(y F).
Case 2: t = c.
Since cE −→ev
v
c, we obtain that w = c ≤2 c = eval(cF).
Case 3: t = (λx .s) or t = (rec f x .s).
By clause (4.12) of Definition 4.3, we have t E ≤1 t F . Since t E −→ev
v
t E , we have
w = t E ≤2 t F = eval(t F).
Case 4: t = (r s), r E −→ev
v
u, s E −→ev
v
v, u v −→ap
v
w.
By the induction hypothesis (a), we obtain u ≤2 eval(r F) and v ≤2 eval(s F). By the
induction hypothesis (b), we obtain
w ≤2 apply(eval(r F), eval(s F)) = eval((r s)F).
(b) Assume that u v −→ap
v
w and u ≤2 u′ and v ≤2 v′. Since u ≤2 u′, by clause (4.14) of
Definition 4.3, there exists a value u′′ such that u ≤1 u′′ and u′′ ≤ u′. Since u ≤1 u′′, there
are two cases according to the clauses (4.12) and (4.13) in Definition 4.3.
Case 1: u = s E , u′′ = s F and E(y) ≤2 F(y) for all variables free in s, where
s = (λx .t) or s = (rec f x .t). Consider the case of s = (rec f x .t):
Since u v −→ap
v
w, we have t (E[x → v, f → u]) −→evv w.
The induction hypothesis (a) yields that
w ≤2 eval(t (F[x → v′, f → u′′])) = apply(u′′, v′) ≤ apply(u′, v′).
By Property (4.16), we obtain that w ≤2 apply(u′, v′).
Case 2: u = (rec f x .t) and (λx .t)[u′′/ f ] ≤ u′′:
Since u v −→ap
v
w, we have t[v/x, u/ f ] −→ev
v
w.
The induction hypothesis (a) yields that
w ≤2 eval(t[v′/x, u′′/ f ]) = apply((λx .t)[u′′/ f ], v′) ≤ apply(u′, v′).
In the last step we use the fact that (λx .t)[u′′/ f ] ≤ u′′ ≤ u′. 
The following lemma is proved by induction on the type of the values u and v.
Lemma 4.5. If u ≤2 v, then u ≤ v.
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Proof. By induction on the type of u. Assume that u ≤2 v. By clause (4.14) of
Definition 4.3, there exists a value u′ such that u ≤1 u′ and u′ ≤ v.
Assume that u is of basic type. Then u is a constant and u = u′. Thus, u ≤ v.
Assume that u is of type σ → τ . Let w be a closed value of type σ . By Lemma 4.4 it
follows that apply(u, w) ≤2 apply(v,w). Since apply(u, w) is of type τ , by the induction
hypothesis, it follows that apply(u, w) ≤ apply(v,w). Since the term w has been chosen
arbitrarily, by the definition of ≤σ→τ , we obtain u ≤ v. 
We have shown that the relation ≤2 is the same as the original relation ≤:
Lemma 4.6. uˆ ≤2 vˆ ⇐⇒ uˆ ≤ vˆ.
Now we can show that the monotonicity axiom (3.18) is valid. Assume that eval(s E) ≤
eval(s′E) and eval(t E) ≤ eval(t ′E). Then we have
eval((s t)E) = apply(eval(s E), eval(t E)) (4.5)
≤ apply(eval(s′E), eval(t ′E)) (4.1), Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6
= eval((s′ t ′)E) (4.5).
Hence, the axiom s  s′ ∧ t  t ′ → s t  s′ t ′ (3.18) is valid.
In order to show that the minimality axiom (3.20) is valid assume that the left-hand
side (λx .t)[v˜/ f ]  v˜ is true under E . Hence, (λx .t)E[ f → v˜E] ≤ v˜E . By (4.13) of
Definition 4.3, we have (rec f x .t)E ≤1 v˜E . By (4.18) and Lemma 4.5, it follows that
(rec f x .t)E ≤ v˜E and thus (rec f x .t)  v˜ is true under E . Hence, the minimality
axiom (3.20) is valid.
The scheme of computational induction (3.21),
∀ f (A → A[λx .t/ f ]) → A[rec f x .t/ f ],
has two versions. In the first version, A is of the form ∀x ( f x ↓ → B[ f x/y]) where f is
not free in B and f is of type σ → ι with a basic type ι. In the second version, A is of the
form ∀x ( f x ↓ → B) where f is not free in B and there is no restriction on the type of f .
Take an instance of the scheme and assume that ∀ f (A → A[λx .t/ f ]) is true under E .
Define the terms recn as follows:
rec0 :≡ (rec f x . f x) and recn+1 :≡ (λx .t)E[ f → recn] for n ∈ N.
We show that the formula A is true under E[ f → recn] by induction on n. The base
case follows from the fact that the function rec0 is everywhere undefined and therefore
eval(rec0 v) = ⊥ for each value v. Hence, the formula A is true under E[ f → rec0]. In the
induction step, we assume that A is true under E[ f → recn]. Since ∀ f (A → A[λx .t/ f ])
is true under E , it follows that A[λx .t/ f ] is true under E[ f → recn]. By Substitution
Lemma 4.2, it follows that A is true under E[ f → (λx .t)E[ f → recn]], which means
that A is true under E[ f → recn+1].
We have to show that A[rec f x .t/ f ] is true under E . We first consider the case where
A is the formula ∀x ( f x ↓ → B[ f x/y]), f is not free in B and the type of f is σ → ι.
Assume that v is a value such that eval((rec f x .t)E v) = ⊥. Then there exists a value w
such that (rec f x .t)E v −→evv w. Since the value w is of basic type ι, it must be a constant.
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By Lemma 4.7 below, there exists an n ∈ N such that recn v −→evv w. Since A is true
under E[ f → recn] and eval(recn v) = ⊥, the formula B[ f x/y] is true under E[ f →
recn, x → v]. Since f x  (rec f x .t) x is true under E[ f → recn, x → v], we can
apply the substitution principle (3.37) (which is derivable in BPT without computational
induction) and obtain that B[(rec f x .t) x/y] is true under E[x → v]. Since v has been
chosen arbitrarily, it follows that A[rec f x .t/ f ] is true under E .
In the second case, A is the formula ∀x ( f x ↓ → B), where f is not free in B . Let
v be a value such that eval((rec f x .t)E v) = ⊥. We have to show that B is true under
E[x → v]. By Lemma 4.7 below, there exists an n ∈ N such that eval(recn v) = ⊥.
Since A is true under E[ f → recn], it follows that B is true under E[x → v]. Hence,
A[rec f x .t/ f ] is true under E .
It remains to show that recursively defined functions can be approximated by finite
unfoldings of the definition. Let rec gz.r be a closed term. We define the finite unfoldings
recn of rec gz.r as follows:
rec0 :≡ rec gz.g z and recn+1 :≡ (λz.r)[recn/g] for n ∈ N.
Hence, rec0 is an everywhere undefined function and recn+1 is obtained by substituting the
term recn in λz.t for the variable g. By Lemma 4.4(a) and Lemma 4.6 we obtain
rec0 ≤ rec1 ≤ · · · ≤ recn ≤ · · · ≤ rec gz.r.
Let t|n be the result of replacing in t all occurrences of rec gz.r by recn . For ground
terms t we obtain by Lemma 4.4(a) and Lemma 4.6:
(4.19) If m ≤ n, then eval(t|m) ≤ eval(t|n).
(4.20) eval(t|n) ≤ eval(t) for every n ∈ N.
If a closed term t has value v, then in the computation from t to v only finitely many
unfoldings of rec gz.r are used. These unfoldings can already be made at the beginning as
the following lemma shows.
Lemma 4.7 (Unfolding). Let t be a closed term.
(a) If t −→evv v, then ∀m ∈ N ∃n ∈ N (v|m ≤ eval(t|n)).
(b) If u v −→ap
v
w, then ∀m ∈ N ∃n ∈ N (w|m ≤ apply(u|n, v|n)).
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the definition of t −→evv v and u v −→apv w.
Case 1: v −→ev
v
v. We have v|m = eval(v|m).
Case 2: s −→ev
v
u, t −→ev
v
v, u v −→ap
v
w, s t −→ev
v
w. By the induction hypothesis there
exists an i such that w|m ≤ apply(u|i, v|i). Again, by the induction hypothesis, there exist
j and k such that u|i ≤ eval(s| j) and v|i ≤ eval(t|k). Let n = max( j, k). Then we have
v|m ≤ apply(u|i, v|i)
≤ apply(eval(s| j), eval(t|k)) Lemma 4.4(b)
≤ apply(eval(s|n), eval(t|n)) (4.19)
= eval((s t)|n) (4.5).
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Case 3: r [rec gz.r/g, u/z] −→ev
v
v, (rec gz.r) u −→ap
v
v. By the induction hypothesis
there exists an n such that v|m ≤ eval(r [recn/g, (u|n)/z]). We obtain
v|m ≤ eval(r [recn/g, (u|n)/z])
= apply((λz.r)[recn/g], u|n) (4.2)
= apply(recn+1, u|n) Def. of recn+1
≤ apply(recn+1, u|n + 1) (4.19) and Lemma 4.4(b).
Case 4: t[rec f x .t/ f, u/x] −→evv v, (rec f x .t) u −→apv v and the term rec f x .t is
different from rec gz.r . By the induction hypothesis there exists an n such that v|m ≤
eval(t|n[rec f x .(t|n)/ f, (u|n)/x]) = apply((rec f x .t)|n, u|n). 
The preceding lemma concludes the proof that the axioms and rules of VPT are valid
under the call-by-value interpretation. We have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8. If a formula A is derivable in VPT, then [[A]]E = t for every call-by-value
environment E that covers the free variables of E.
Once we know that the system VPT is sound with respect to the call-by-value
interpretation, we can easily show that VPT is adequate for call-by-value evaluation. By
adequacy we mean having the two properties (1.1) and (1.2) mentioned in the introduction.
Theorem 4.9. The logic VPT is adequate for call-by-value evaluation.
Proof. Let t be a closed program.
Assume that the formula t ↓ is derivable in VPT. Then t ↓ is true under the call-by-value
interpretation which means that eval(t) = ⊥. Hence, the evaluation of t terminates.
Assume that t is of basic type and that the equation t = v is derivable in VPT for a
value v. Then the formula v  t is derivable in VPT as well. Hence, the formula v  t is
true under the call-by-value interpretation and v ≤ eval(t). Since v is of a basic type, this
means that v = eval(t). Hence, the evaluation of t terminates with result v.
For the converse directions the following statements can be shown by induction on
t −→evv v and u v −→apv w:
(a) If t −→evv v, then t = v is derivable in BPT.
(b) If u v −→ap
v
w, then u v = w is derivable in BPT.
The principles (3.11), (3.28) and (3.42) are used in the derivations. 
5. Adequacy of the logic for call-by-name
The call-by-name evaluation function is extended to a total function. We use the same
names and symbols as in the previous section. The names and symbols, however, now refer
to call-by-name evaluation.
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eval(t) :=
{
v, if t −→ev
n
v;
⊥, if there is no v with t −→evn v.
apply(uˆ, t) :=
{
v, if uˆ t −→ap
n
v;
⊥, if there is no v with uˆ t −→ap
n
v.
The call-by-name evaluation function and the call-by-name application function have the
following properties:
(5.1) apply(⊥, t) = ⊥.
(5.2) apply(λx .t, s) = eval(t[s/x]).
(5.3) apply(rec f x .t, s) = eval(t[s/x, rec f x .t/ f ]).
(5.4) eval(v) = v.
(5.5) eval(s t) = apply(eval(s), t).
The difference between the call-by-name approximation relation in the following
definition and the call-by-value approximation relation in Definition 4.1 is that for
functions one has to take into account arbitrary closed terms as arguments and not only
values.
Definition 5.1. The call-by-name approximation relation ≤τ is defined on the set Vˆ τ by
induction on the type τ :
uˆ ≤ι vˆ :⇐⇒ uˆ = ⊥ or uˆ = vˆ
uˆ ≤σ→τ vˆ :⇐⇒ uˆ = ⊥ or
vˆ = ⊥ and apply(uˆ, t) ≤τ apply(vˆ, t) for every closed term tσ .
An induction on types yields that the relations so defined are pre-orderings and that ⊥
is the least element in Vˆ τ .
A call-by-name environment is a finite function that assigns closed terms (and not just
values) to variables.
E = {xτ11 → sτ11 , . . . , xτnn → sτnn }.
Since the evaluation of a closed term may diverge, a call-by-name environment can assign
undefined terms to variables. The truth value [[A]]E ∈ {t, f} is defined as in the call-by-
value case except that the quantifiers now range over arbitrary closed terms and not only
over values:
[[∀xτ A]]E :=
{
t, if [[A]]E[x →t ] = t for each closed term tτ ;
f, otherwise.
[[∃xτ A]]E :=
{
t, if there exists a closed term tτ with [[A]]E[x →t ] = t;
f, otherwise.
The main goal is to show that all axioms and rules of NPT are valid under this
interpretation. The following substitution principle for the call-by-name interpretation
is more general than the corresponding principle of the call-by-value interpretation
(Lemma 4.2). The substitution principle is not restricted to syntactic values.
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Lemma 5.2 (Substitution for Call-by-name).
If t is a term, then [[A[t/x]]]E = [[A]]E[x →t E].
The proof that the axioms and rules of NPT are valid under the call-by-name
interpretation goes similarly to the call-by-value case. To show that the axiom ∃xτ¬x ↓
of NPT is valid we consider the following closed term of type τ :
(rec f (ι→ι)→τ x ι→ι. f x) (λyι.y).
The evaluation of this term does not terminate. Hence, if we bind the variable x to this
term, then the formula x ↓ becomes false and therefore ∃xτ¬x ↓ is true.
For the monotonicity axiom (3.18) and the minimality axiom (3.20) we introduce the
auxiliary relations u ≤1 v, u ≤2 v and s ≤3 t . We will show in (5.18) below that the
relation ≤2 is the same as the call-by-name approximation relation ≤. Moreover, we will
see in (5.19) that the relation s ≤3 t holds exactly if eval(s) ≤ eval(t).
Definition 5.3. The relations u ≤1 v, u ≤2 v and s ≤3 t are inductively generated by the
following clauses:
(5.6) c ≤1 c.
(5.7) If s = (λx .t) or s = (rec f x .t) and E(y) ≤3 F(y) for each y ∈ FV(s), then
s E ≤1 s F .
(5.8) If (λx .t)[v/ f ] ≤ v, then (rec f x .t) ≤1 v.
(5.9) If u ≤1 v and v ≤ w, then u ≤2 w.
(5.10) If eval(s) ≤2 eval(t), then s ≤3 t .
(5.11) If s ≤3 s′ and t ≤3 t ′, then s s′ ≤3 t t ′.
The first three clauses are for the relation ≤1, the fourth clause is for the relation ≤2
and the last two clauses are for ≤3. It is easy to see that all three relations are reflexive.
Moreover, the relation ≤ implies ≤2, the relation ≤1 implies ≤2 and the relation ≤2
implies ≤3.
(5.12) v ≤1 v, v ≤2 v, t ≤3 t .
(5.13) If u ≤2 v and v ≤ w, then u ≤2 w.
(5.14) If u ≤ v, then u ≤2 v.
(5.15) If u ≤1 v, then u ≤2 v.
(5.16) If u ≤2 v, then u ≤3 v.
The following substitution property can be shown by induction on the length of a term t :
(5.17) If E(x) ≤3 F(x) for each x ∈ FV(t), then t E ≤3 t F .
The main technical lemma is proved by induction on the length of the call-by-name
evaluation of a term.
Lemma 5.4. For closed terms s, t and closed values u, v we have:
(a) If s ≤3 t , then eval(s) ≤2 eval(t).
(b) If u ≤2 v and s ≤3 t , then apply(u, s) ≤2 apply(v, t).
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Proof. By induction on s −→ev
n
w and u t −→ap
n
w we prove:
(a) If t −→ev
n
w and t ≤3 t ′, then w ≤2 eval(t ′).
(b) If u t −→ap
n
w and u ≤2 u′ and t ≤3 t ′, then w ≤2 apply(u′, t ′).
(a) Assume that t −→evn w and t ≤3 t ′. Since t ≤3 t ′, there are two cases according to the
clauses (5.10) and (5.11) in Definition 5.3.
Case 1: eval(t) ≤2 eval(t ′).
Since w = eval(t), we obtain w ≤2 eval(t ′).
Case 2: t = (r s), t ′ = (r ′ s′), r ≤3 r ′, s ≤3 s′:
Since t −→ev
n
w there exists a value u such that r −→ev
n
u and u s −→ap
n
w. By the induction
hypothesis, we obtain that u ≤2 eval(r ′) and again, by the induction hypothesis,
w ≤2 apply(eval(r ′), s′) (5.5)= eval(r ′ s′) = eval(t ′).
(b) Assume that u t −→ap
n
w and u ≤2 u′ and t ≤3 t ′. Since u ≤2 u′, by clause (5.9) of
Definition 5.3, there exists a value v such that u ≤1 v and v ≤ u′. Since u ≤1 v, there are
two cases according to the clauses (5.7) and (5.8) in Definition 5.3.
Case 1: u = s E , v = s F and E(y) ≤3 F(y) for all variables free in s, where s = (λx .t)
or s = (rec f x .t). Consider the case of s = (rec f x .t):
Since u t −→ap
n
w, we have r(E[x → t, f → u]) −→evn w.
By the substitution property (5.17), we obtain that
r(E[x → t, f → u]) ≤3 r(F[x → t ′, f → u′]).
The induction hypothesis yields that
w ≤2 eval(r(F[x → t ′, f → u′])) (5.3)= apply(v, t ′) ≤ apply(u′, t ′).
In the last step we use Definition 5.1 and v ≤ u′.
Case 2: u = (rec f x .s) and (λx .s)[v/ f ] ≤ v:
Since u t −→ap
n
w, we have s[t/x, u/ f ] −→evn w.
By the substitution property (5.17), we obtain that
s[t/x, u/ f ] ≤3 s[t ′/x, v/ f ].
The induction hypothesis (a) yields that
w ≤2 eval(s[t ′/x, v/ f ]) (5.2)= apply((λx .s)[v/ f ], t ′) ≤ apply(u′, t ′).
In the last step we use Definition 5.1 and the fact that (λx .s)[v/ f ] ≤ v ≤ u′. 
The following lemma is proved by induction on the type of the value u.
Lemma 5.5. If u ≤2 v, then u ≤ v.
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Proof. Assume that u ≤2 v. By clause (5.9) of Definition 5.3, there exists a value u′ such
that u ≤1 u′ and u′ ≤ v.
Assume that u is of basic type. Then u is a constant and u = u′. Thus, u ≤ v.
Assume that u is of type σ → τ . Let t be a closed term of type σ . By Lemma 5.4 it
follows that apply(u, t) ≤2 apply(v, t). Since apply(u, t) is of type τ , by the induction
hypothesis, it follows that apply(u, t) ≤ apply(v, t). Since the term t has been chosen
arbitrarily, by the definition of ≤σ→τ in Definition 5.1, we obtain u ≤ v. 
We have shown that the relation ≤2 is the same as the original relation ≤:
(5.18) uˆ ≤2 vˆ ⇐⇒ uˆ ≤ vˆ.
We can use this fact together with Lemma 5.4 to obtain the following characterization of
the relation ≤3:
(5.19) s ≤3 t ⇐⇒ eval(s) ≤ eval(t).
Now we can show that the monotonicity axiom (3.18) is valid. Assume that eval(s E) ≤
eval(s′E) and eval(t E) ≤ eval(t ′E). Then we have
eval((s t)E) = apply(eval(s E), t E) (5.5)
≤ apply(eval(s′E), t ′E) (5.18), (5.19), Lemma 5.4
= eval((s′ t ′)E) (5.5).
Hence, the monotonicity axiom s  s′ ∧ t  t ′ → s t  s′ t ′ is valid.
For the minimality axiom (3.20) assume that (λx .t)[v˜/ f ]  v˜ is true under E . Hence,
(λx .t)E[ f → v˜E] ≤ eval(v˜E). Let v = eval(v˜E). By (5.19) and Lemma 5.4, it follows
that
(λx .t)E[ f → v] ≤ (λx .t)E[ f → v˜E] ≤ v.
By (5.8), we have (rec f x .t)E ≤1 v and, by (5.15) and (5.18), (rec f x .t)E ≤ v. Hence,
(rec f x .t)  v˜ is true under E .
That the scheme of computational induction (3.21) is true under the call-by-name
interpretation can be shown by a similar argument to that in the call-by-value case using
a call-by-name version of Lemma 4.7 regarding the unfolding of recursively defined
functions. Thus, we can conclude with the main theorem.
Theorem 5.6. If a formula A is derivable in NPT, then [[A]]E = t for every call-by-name
environment E that covers the free variables of E.
For the embedding of call-by-name computations into NPT we use the unrestricted
version of the β-Axiom (3.11)
(λx .t) s  t[s/x]
and the unrestricted version of (3.42)
(rec f x .t) s  t[s/x, rec f x .t/ f ]
for arbitrary terms s and obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.7. The logic NPT is adequate for call-by-name evaluation.
As a corollary we obtain the following embedding of call-by-value evaluation into call-
by-name evaluation: If a closed term t terminates with result v in call-by-value evaluation,
then t terminates also in call-by-name evaluation with a result w such that v ≤ w and
w ≤ v (with the relation ≤ of Definition 5.1). This can be seen as follows. If t terminates
with result v in call-by-value evaluation, then the equation t = v is derivable in the basic
system BPT (see the proof of Theorem 4.9). Hence, the equation t = v is true under the
call-by-name interpretation which means that eval(t) ≤ v and v ≤ eval(t), where eval(t)
is the result of the call-by-name evaluation of the program t .
5.1. A comparison of the two cases
In both cases the adequacy of the axioms is shown by interpreting the formulas in the
standard term models for call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation. In the case of call-
by-value the environment E in [[A]]E assigns closed values to the free variables of the
formula A, whereas in the case of call-by-name, the environment E assigns arbitrary closed
terms (including application terms which may diverge) to the variables.
In the definition of the approximation relation ≤ for call-by-value in Definition 4.1 a
term u of a function type approximates a term v of the same type if for each closed value w
of the argument type, u applied to w approximates u applied to w. In the case of call-by-
name in Definition 5.1, one has to quantify over arbitrary closed terms instead.
In both cases the truth of most of the axioms in the standard term model can be
established easily. The difficulties arise for the monotonicity axiom (3.18) of function
application and the second fixed point axiom (3.20) that says that functions defined by
recursion are minimal. The problem is that in order to show that a recursive function
rec x f.t is monotonic, one has already to know that it is monotonic, since the same term
rec x f.t is substituted for f when the function is applied to an argument.
To break out of this vicious circle, auxiliary relations ≤1 and ≤2 (or ≤3) are inductively
defined in Definitions 4.3 and 5.3. The auxiliary relations are defined in such a way that the
monotonicity of the application with respect to ≤2 can be proved by a simple induction on
the length of the evaluation. In a second lemma, one shows that the relation ≤2 is the same
as the approximation relation ≤ by a simple induction on types; hence the application is
also monotonic with respect to ≤.
6. Observational equivalence
The basic logic of partial terms BPT and its extensions VPT and NPT are extensional.
Two programs are considered to be equal if they have the same domain and produce equal
outputs when they are applied to arguments, i.e.
s ↓ ∧ t ↓ → (s = t ↔ ∀x (s x  t x)).
Thereby, the strict equality (=) and partial equality () of programs is defined in terms of
a more basic approximation relation () which is extensional, too:
s ↓ ∧ t ↓ ∧ ∀x (s x  t x) → s  t .
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In the call-by-value and call-by-name interpretations of the logic, the approximation
relation  is interpreted by an extensional relation ≤. The relation ≤ is defined by induction
on the types of the programs (Definition 4.1 for call-by-value evaluation and Definition 5.1
for call-by-name evaluation).
Another possibility is to consider two programs to be equal if one program can be
replaced by the other in any context without changing the functional behavior of the overall
program. In other words, two programs are equal if no difference can be observed from
outside when one subprogram is replaced by the other. This kind of equality is called
observational equality.
For simply typed programs, the extensional equality and the observational equality are
the same. This is known as the context lemma and was proved for the first time by R. Milner
in [12] for simply typed combinators and call-by-name evaluation using an analysis of the
reductions of terms. In the following we give a proof of the context lemma for simply
typed programs that include also recursion. We use the call-by-value interpretation and the
call-by-name interpretation of the previous sections and the technical lemmas concerning
the monotonicity of the relation ≤. We focus on the call-by-value case. The call-by-name
version of the context lemma can be proved in the same way.
A context C is a typed term that contains exactly one occurrence of the (typed) star
symbol. The term C[t] is obtained from C by replacing the star symbol by the term t . Free
variables of t can thereby become bound by the context. A context C closes a term t if C[t]
is closed.
Definition 6.1 (Observational Approximation). A term s observationally approximates t
(written s obs t) if for each closing context C the following two conditions hold:
(6.1) If eval(C[s]) = ⊥, then eval(C[t]) = ⊥.
(6.2) If C[s] is of ground type and eval(C[s]) = ⊥, then
eval(C[s]) = eval(C[t]).
Two terms s and t are observationally equivalent if s obs t and t obs s.
Several properties of the observationally approximation relation are easy to prove. For
example, the relation obs is preserved by contexts.
(6.3) If s obs t , then C[s] obs C[t].
For an environment E a canonical context CE is defined as follows:
(6.4) If E = {x1 → v1, . . . , xn → vn}, then CE = (λx1 · · · λxn.∗)v1 · · · vn .
Obviously, the evaluation of a term t in an environment E yields the same result as the
evaluation of t in the canonical context CE .
(6.5) eval(t E) = eval(CE [t]) for every closing environment E of t .
The following context lemma says that a program s observationally approximates t iff the
formula s  t is true under the call-by-value interpretation.
Lemma 6.2 (Context). Let s and t be two terms of the same type. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
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(a) s obs t .
(b) For each closing environment E, eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E).
Proof. The implication (a) ⇒ (b) is shown by induction on types. Assume that s obs t .
Let E be a closing environment for s and t . We have to show that eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E).
Case 1. The terms s and t are of basic type: Then CE [s] and CE [t] are of basic
type, too. Assume that eval(s E) = ⊥. Then eval(CE [s]) = ⊥ and, by the definition
of the relation obs, eval(CE [s]) = eval(CE [t]). Hence, by Definition 4.1, we obtain
eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E).
Case 2. The terms s and t are of type σ → τ : If eval(s E) = ⊥, there is nothing to show.
Otherwise, eval(CE [s]) = eval(s E) = ⊥ and, since s obs t , eval(t E) = eval(CE [t]) =
⊥. Let u = eval(s E) and v = eval(t E). We have to show that apply(u, w) ≤ apply(v,w)
for each value w of type σ . By (6.3), it follows that CE [s]w obs CE [t]w. Since
CE [s]w and CE [t]w are both of type τ , it follows, by the induction hypothesis, that
eval(CE [s]w) ≤ eval(CE [t]w). We obtain:
apply(u, w) = apply(eval(s E),w)
= apply(eval(CE [s]),w) (6.5)
= eval(CE [s]w) (4.5)
≤ eval(CE [t]w) (induction hypothesis)
= apply(eval(t E),w) (4.5), (6.5)
= apply(v, r).
Since w has been chosen arbitrarily, it follows that u ≤ v.
For the direction (b) ⇒ (a) assume that eval(s E) ≤ eval(t E) for every closing
environment E . This means that the formula ∀x (s  t) is true, where x is the list of
free variables of s and t . Using the properties (3.18), (3.34) and (3.35) one can derive in
BPT the formula
∀x(s  t) → C[s]  C[t]
for every context C . By Theorem 4.8, it follows that C[s]  C[t] is true under the call-by-
value interpretation for every context C . By the definition of the interpretation of , this
means that eval(C[s]) ≤ eval(C[t]) for every context C . Hence, s obs t . 
Note that the main technical ingredients of the above proof are Lemma 4.4 in the call-by-
value case and Lemma 5.4 in the call-by-name case which are the basis of the Theorems 4.8
and 5.6.
7. Conclusion
The direct method does not simplify the correctness proof. The direct method, however,
yields also results about the proof-theoretic strength of the formal systems. The term
models under consideration can be encoded into weak systems like Peano Arithmetic (PA)
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or subsystems of PA. This means that although our logics contain functionals of higher
types they are first-order systems (in the proof-theoretic sense).
Of course, one could add principles that postulate the existence of higher-order objects.
An example of such a principle is the comprehension scheme for monotonic functions of
arbitrary types. By that we mean the collection of formulas of the form
mon(A, xσ , yτ ) → ∃ f σ→τ ∀x, y ( f x  y ↔ A(x, y))
where f is not free in A(x, y) and mon(A, xσ , yτ ) is an abbreviation for the formula
∀xσ∃yτ A(x, y) ∧ ∀x, y, x ′, y ′ (A(x, y) ∧ A(x ′, y ′) ∧ x  x ′ → y  y ′)
which expresses the fact that A(x, y) is the graph of a monotonic function from σ to τ .
The comprehension scheme for monotonic functions is not valid under the call-by-value or
the call-by-name interpretations given in this paper. To validate the comprehension scheme
one has to take the way of denotational semantics sketched in Section 3.3.
In this article we focus on a small fragment of functional programming languages. Our
approach, however, can be extended to product types and tuples, inductive algebraic types
with data constructors and pattern matching, simultaneous recursive definitions and generic
programs with type parameters. Hence, we believe that our axioms and proof rules already
cover a large subset of existing functional programming languages.
One advantage of functional programming is that the programs cannot update the
global state. Functional programs can therefore be viewed as mathematical functions and
reasoning about functional programs is possible in a way we are familiar with from
mathematics. The absence of a global state, however, has been the main obstacle to
widespread use of functional programming languages in practice. In the much bigger world
of object-oriented programming the universe consists of objects that have a state and each
function call updates the state of one or more of the objects. In other words, object-oriented
programming is state based.
One possibility for overcoming the drawbacks of functional programming is to add
imperative features—for example, the pointers of ML. On the logical side, however,
this requires rather complicated and unintuitive axioms and proof rules (see [11] for
an axiomatization of a Lisp-like language with destructive updates). Another possibility
proposed by Odersky in [15] is adding variable functions that can be updated.
From the logical point of view, however, the difference between pointers and variable
functions is minimal, since pointers are nothing but arguments of a global memory
function. For example, the assignment x := 2 of ML can be viewed as an update of the
memory function ‘!’ at the argument x to the value 2. From the practical point of view
there might be a difference, since variable functions are local and cannot be updated by
every part of the program. In both approaches the character of a high-level programming
language disappears and the resulting languages are on the abstraction level of their lowest
ingredient (pointers or array updates).
Another solution is the combination (and not the mingling) of functional programming
languages with Gurevich Abstract State Machines [3,7]. The idea is to use a pure
applicative functional programming language for the specification (and implementation)
of the static part of the system (static functions in ASM terminology) and ASMs for
the dynamic part (dynamic functions). The result is an executable high-level system
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specification. The high-level character of the functional programming language is kept
in this way. Also the freedom of ASMs in choosing the abstraction level is not restricted.
This approach has been used in the specification and verification of Java, the Java Virtual
Machine, the Java Bytecode Verifier and the Java-to-JVM compiler in [20]. We plan to
implement the axiomatization of functional programming described in this paper together
with the logic for Abstract State Machines of [19]. We hope to obtain a system for doing
high-level correctness proofs of security critical components—for example, the bytecode
verifier in [20].
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